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Ethics Counsel's Role in Combating the
"Ostrich" Tendency
Susan Saab Fortney'
In college I served as a resident assistant in a dormitory. My way of dealing
with marijuana use on my dormitory floor was to conveniently say, "If I don't
see it-it's not there." Some firm managers effectively use a similar strategy in
handling internal ethics issues such as questionable billing practices. Other firm
principals, including proactive ethics counsel, feel compelled to confront, and
even discover, conduct that falls below firm and professional standards. Rather
than waiting for firm members to present ethics issues, proactive ethics attor-
neys conscientiously participate in risk avoidance and the formulation of firm
policies and procedures.
To illustrate the importance of ethics advisors playing an active role in
building a law firm's ethical infrastructure, this article focuses on ethics prob-
lems related to hourly billing. Ethics experts who have studied hourly billing
recognize attorneys' reluctance to report billing misconduct, In the book, THE
HONEST HouR, Professor William G. Ross refers to the inclination of attorneys
to close their eyes when they suspect billing irregularities.2 Professor Lisa G.
Lerman made a similar observation in noting that firm attorneys who share
income may "turn a blind eye to misconduct" by another firm attorney.' Both
1. Professor, Texas Tech University School of Law. Portions of the article, Susan Saab Fortney,
Soul for Sale: An Empirical Study of Associate Satisfaction, Law Firm Culture, and the Effects of
Billable Hour Requirements, 69 UMKC L. REv. 239 (2000), ©UMKC LAW REvIEW are abridged
in this piece. Reprinted with permission. I thank Dr. Cynthia Spanhel, director of the
Department of Research and Analysis, and the Don Jones, division of the State Bar of Texas for
supporting the empirical study on which this article is based. I also thank Professor Lisa Lerman
for her valuable feedback on the survey instrument used in the study
2. \VILLIAM G. Ross, TH-E HONEST HOUR, THE ETHics OF TIME-BASED BILLING BY ATTORNEYS
199 (1996) (noting that the "reluctance of attorneys to report billing irregularities is partly the
result of a natural fear of making false accusations about suspected misconduct that is not easily
verified and about .vhich ethical nonns are often unclear) (emphasis added).
3. Lisa G. Lerman, B6lue.Cip Bilking- Regulation of Billing and Expense Fraud by Lawyers, 12
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL En TIcs 205, 226-227 (1999) (referring to Professor Deborah
Rhode's suggestion that attorneys, judges and disciplinary officials may suffer from "cognitive con-
servatism" in which "d iey are more likely to register and retain information that is compatible ,,vith
establishcd beliefs or earlier decisions," as -cll as "cognitive dissonance" in which individuals who
make decisions tend to suppress or reconstrue information that casts doubts on that decision). See
Deborah L. Rdode, lnstitutionalizing Ethics 44 CASE W L. REv. 665, 685-686 (1994).
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Professors Lerman and Ross recommend that firms establish ethics counsel or
ethics committees to provide a channel for reporting billing misconduct and to
address other problems associated xwith hourly billing.' Specifically, Professor
Lerman has identified three initiatives for in house ethics advisors and ethics
committees: (1) establishing written policies on billing practices and reimburse-
ment for expenses, (2) training all firm attorneys and support staff on billing
practices and other ethics issues, and (3) encouraging all firm employees to
report possible misconduct to the ethics committee, and ensuring that those
who report are protected from retaliation for raising questions.'
In discussing the need for and efficacy of initiatives by ethics counsel, this
article draws on findings from an empirical study of law firm culture and the
effects of billable hour requirements on associates.' This study was based on a
mail survey of 1000 randomly selected associates in Texas firms who (1) had
been licensed for ten or fewer years as of June 1999, and (2) worked in private
law firms with more than ten attorneys (the Associate Survey).-
The survey form included a number of questions related to firm policies,
controls, and associate attitudes! The following discussion focuses on the study
results that pertain to the work of ethics attorneys in improving institutional
controls and shaping firm culture. As explained below, the first step in address-
ing improper billing practices is for ethics attorneys to appreciate the need for
written policies on billing practices.
THE NEED FOR GUIDANCE ON BILLING
Neophyte attorneys forge into private practice with little or no experience
in billing their time. Often associates start work with a "lecture" from a senior
4. Lerman, supra note 3, at 298 and Ross, supra note 2, at 206 (suggesting that ethics commit-
tees encourage the reporting of billing irregularities by permitting the "disposition of complaints
in a manner that might be far more discreet, nonpunitive, and constructive than a report to bar
of law enforcement officials").
5. Lerman, supra note 3, at 298. Professor Lerman's recommendations for eliminating billing
and expense fraud follow an in-depth discussion of sixteen cases involving billing and expense
fraud by prominent lawyers.
6. For a lengthy article on the study findings and recommendations, see Susan Saab Formcy,
Soul for Sale: An Empirical Study of Associate Satisfaction, Law Firm Culture, and the Effects of
Billable Hour Requirements, 69 UMKC L. REv. 239 (2000) ©UMKC LAW REVIEW. Portions of
that article are abridged in this piece.
7. Restricting the sample to attorneys liccnscd for 10 or fewer years helped filter out attorneys
who were "permanent associates" and attorneys who had equity status. Limiting the sample to
persons in firms wvith more than 10 attorneys eliminated solo practitioners and many small firm
attorney who do not use hourly billing as the principal method for billing clients. The letter trans-
mitting the questionnaire also asked the recipients not to complete the survey if they were not
associates currently using hourly billing. Three mailings were sent beginning in 1999 and con-
tinuing into 2000.
8. Dr. Cynthia Spanhel, director of the State Bar of Texas Department of Research and Analysis
assisted in preparing the survey instrument, in conducting the survey, and in analyzing de results.
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attorney who advises associates to "[blill every minute... we'll adjust the bill on
the back end."' This approach to billing does not recognize the traps involved in
billing another attorney's time. First, it assumes that the supervisor possesses
enough information on the client's legal matter in order to evaluate intelligently
the amount of time expended. Second, the approach assumes that the supervisor
can ably sift through associate time sheets that may be a "propaganda piece." "
Finally, if the firm compensates a billing partner for the amount collected from
billed clients, the billing partner may be reluctant to write off associate time."
Some senior attorneys may provide additional guidance on billing in
instructing associates to "write down their time on the same day, be honest, use
good judgment, and don't double bill."'" This general advice gives associates
unfettered discretion because the rules on billing practices remain unclear.
Even when firm managers implement general billing guidelines, attorneys still
have a great deal of latitude in the way that they apply the guidelines. This was
illustrated by a management consultant who found a great deal of disparity in
what firm partners would bill for travel, even though the firm implemented a
policy to hill for travel time." Rather than leaving attorneys in a quandary on
billing practices," firm managers can clarify how and what attorneys should bill.
This guidance can include written guidelines, training programs, and formalized
channels within the firm for open communication.
9. Compare Joseph Calve, A Lawyer's Worth, TF.x. LAw., March 23, 1998, at 3 (referring to the
"stock lecture" that a senior litigation partner gave when the author started working as an associate at
a Wall Street firm) with Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 659,716 (1990) (describ-
ing the experience of a billing paralegal who reported that 'partners told new lawyers and paralegals
to keep complete records of their hours and assured them that if, in reviewing the bills, the partners
thought the time was excessive they would cut the bill." With the exception of one partner who care-
fully checked each of the bill, the pandegal stated that partners "never cut time... [Ulsually they did-
n't even look at the daily time sheet, but just made sure that the narrative was correct,") Id.
10. Sara J. Berman-Barrett, Integrating Beginning Law uyers into the Business of the Lau, 19 No.
LAW P&,c. MGMT. 22, 26 (1993) (explaining that 'the associate's time sheet is likely the major
(and sometime the only) tool a partner-the associate's boss- will ultimately use to evaluate, pro-
mote and give raises or bonuses to the associate").
11. A billing partner would prefer not to write down time if the collections from the section
or from certain clients directly affects the partner's own compensation. On a firm.aide basis a
partner's participation of firm profits creates an incentive to inflate or pad hours. Douglas R.
Richmond, Professional Responsibility and the Bottom Line: The Ethics of Billing, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J.
261, 262 (1996). Presumably partners' desire to serve and satisfy clients will cause partners to
scrutinize all time included in final client bills.
12. John W. Morris, Writing Their Own Rides, Ai. L.W.,June 1995, at 5 (reporting that a quiz
of 29 associates from 22 large firms in nine cities revealed that firms have "few hard and fast
rules" for billing),
13. Id. W en a consultant put a complex but realistic billing hypothetical to partners at one
firm, the charges for one day's activity ranged from 1.5 to 7.8 hours. Id.
14. "If partners in the firm are divided on [a double billing travell issue, associates are placed
in a quandary. As employees, which boss should they follow? As professionals, what do they feel
is right. And it they do not double bill, how will they compete with other associates who do?"
Berman-Barrett, supra note 10, at 27.
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STUDY RESULTS RELATING TO BILLING GUIDANCE AND ETHICS
SYSTEMS
In the Associate Survey only 40%, of the respondents indicated that their
firms had written billing guidelines other than those imposed by clients. Thirty-
six percent of the respondents reported that their firms had no such guidelines.
This 36% can be coupled with the 25% who checked "1 don't know." Associates
who don't know about guidelines or systems essentially operate in a firm in which
guidelines or systems provide no assistance. The fact that one quarter of the
respondents do not know about guidelines suggests a lack of communication
within firms, a problem identified in other studies."AmmCAN BAR ASSOCLATION,
THE REPORT OF AT THE BREAKIMNG POINT, A NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE
EMERGING CRISIS IN TH QUALr" OF LXWYERs' HEALTH AND LrES-ITs IMPRcT
ON LAW FIRMS AND CLIENT SERVICES, Apr. 5-6, 1991, at 4.
The survey results do show a relationship betrveen firm size and written
guidelines. The percentage of firms with written guidelines increases with firm
size. 6 On the other hand, the percentage of firms using written billing guide-
lines decreased as the billing expectation increased. Among those firms with a
minimum billing expectation of 2400 hours a year only 8% used written guide-
lines.'" Undeniably, associates in those firms face a great deal of pressure to bill
without the benefit of written guidance on billing.' Such an environment can
lead to questionable billing practices by some associates, putting more "conser-
vative" associates at a competitive disadvantage in billing.
The majority of the respondents (56%) agreed that clear billing guidelines
would help eliminate questionable billing practices.' An even larger percent-
15. E.g. NALP FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH AND EDUCATION: KEEPING IHE KEEI'ERS:
STRATEGICS FOR ASSOCIATE RETENTION IN TIMES OF ATTRION 106 (Jan. 1998) [hereinafter
Reeping the Keepert Report] (noting the majority of the associates in a focus group "feel com.
munications from firm management or supervising partners could be improved"). As stated in
the Report of the National Conference on The Emerging Crisis in the Quality of Lawyers' Health
and Lives-Its Impact on Law Firms and Client Services:
One of the most common problems cited by participants from all but the smallest firms
was the breakdown of communication within the office. This was true in several critical
areas: Associates have little information about what is happening in the finn. Despite the
fact that they sacrifice their lives for the chance of financial and professional security with
the firm, they are kept in the dark regarding important administrative matters and their
input is not sought."
16. Forty-nine percent of the Large Finns used written guidelines, compared to 39% for
Medium Firms and 26% for Small Firms represented by the respondents.
17. At the other end of the scale, 67% of the respondents with a billing expectation of below
1800 hours work in firms with written guidelines. The percentage of firms with written guide.
lines ranged from 37% to 43% for firms with annual billing expectations in categories from 1800
to 2399 hours.
18. Conceivably, written guidelines may hamper an associate's ability to meet high billable hour
requirements.
19. This 56% breaks down to 18% who "strongly agree" and 38% who "somewhat agree."
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age (7 1%) agreed with the following statement: "Clear billing guidelines would
help attorneys who want to practice ethically."20
Training on billing can also help attorneys who want to practice ethically.
The survey results revealed that only a small percentage of respondents received
more than two hours of law school or firm training on billing.' Surprisingly,
35% indicated that the firm provided less than one hour of training or instruc-
tion on billing and 26% of the respondents noted that the firm provided no
training or instruction on billing.,"
Firm managers who do not provide training or written guidelines to associates
may not affirmatively communicate firm nonns to new associates, leaving them to
learn institutional norms by observing the behavior of others." As suggested by
Professor Lerman, "many associates anxious to assimilate themselves into an insti-
tution and to be successful within it, will watch de more experienced lawyers to see
what the real standards of conduct are.""4 "If the senior lawyers are not precise in
their billing practices, the junior lawyers will not be.""1 Rather than leaving associ-
ates to discern standards and acceptable conduct, firms should implement guide-
lines and training programs to encourage ethical behavior and discourage abuses. 6
These measures serve as part of the firm's ethical infrastructure."
Another important aspect of the firm's ethical infrastructure is a system or
policy for dealing with ethical concerns of attorneys.' While a majority of
respondents (54%) indicated that their firms had such a system or policy, 22%
said that the firm had no such system or policy and 24% checked the "I don't
know" box.' Again, the number of associates who did not have knowledge of a
20. This 71% reflects 30% who "strongly agree" and 41% who "somewhat agree."
21. Fourteen percent of the respondents noted that the firm provided more than two hours of
training on billing and 16% indicated that more than two hours of law school class time was
devoted to discussing the ethics of hourly billing.
22. This compares to 42% of the respondents who noted that no amount of law school class
time was devoted to discussing the ethics of hourly billing.
23. Lerman, supra note 9, at 681.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Austin Sarat, En,ancements of Professionalism: A Study of Judges' and Lawyers' Account of
Etbtcs and Civility in Litigation, 67 FORDHAMt L. RE'. 809, 824 (1998) (noting that attorneys' views
on whether firms have such distinctive cultures varies depending on the positions of attorneys
within firms).
27. See Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNEI i. L. Ra.V. 1 (1991)
(using the term "ethical infrastructure to refer to firm policies, procedures, and systems that con.
trol attorney conduct).
28. Eighty.three percent of the firms that use written guidelines (83%) also have an ethics sys.
tem or policy for dealing with the ethical concerns of attorneys. This might suggest that firms that
are conscientious about billing matters also appreciate the importance of a general system or pol-
icy regarding ethics.
29. A 1995 survey of all managing partners of all Texas firms with 10 or more attorneys revealed that
73% of the respondents indicated that their firms had an appointed principal or commintee to handle
ethics or malpractice problems. Susan Saab Fortney; Are Law Firm Partners filnds Unto Themselves?
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firm system suggests a lack of communication within firms.' Given the "natur-
al reluctance of attorneys to report misconduct by their peers," firm managers
should both adopt some type of internal reporting policy or system and com-
municate to associates the importance of reporting concerns." By doing so, firm
leadership signals a commitment to ethical practice."
With the exception of in-firm meetings, which are commonly conducted in
smaller firms, these percentages show a relationship between firm size and
implementation of formal ethics systems or policies. Larger percentages of
respondents from Small and Medium Firms (35% and 24% respectively)
checked "other" possibly reflecting the tendency of smaller firms to rely on
informal monitoring."
Table I shows the types of ethics policies or systems that the respondents'
finns have implemented.
TABLE 1
FIRM SIZE AND ETHICS MEASURES OR SYSTEMS
Small Firms Medium Firms Large Firms
11-24 25-100 over 100
attorneys attorneys attorneys
Designated ethics counsel 15% 35% 56%
Ethics committee 8% 24% 63%
Written policy encouraging
the reporting of misconduct 12% 24% 33%
Scheduled in-firm meetings 42% 16% 18%
Scheduled ethics training 31% 42% 51%
Other means/measures 35% 24% 9%
An Empirical Study of Law Firm Peer Review and Culture, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL Ei HIcs 271,289 (19%).
The difference between this 73% of firm managers responding to the 1995 survey and the 54% of
associates responding to the Associate Survey may relate to a number of factors induding the lapse in
time, the lack of communication with associates in firms, and the possibility that some firm managers
"overstated" the existence of a system. Compare Stephen R. Volk et al., Law Firm Policies and
Procedures in An Era of Increasing Responsibilities: Analysis of a Survey of Law Firms, 48 BUS. LAWx'.
1567, 1578 (1993) (reporting on a 1992 study of fifty law firms nationwide which found that 25% of
the respondents had a policy and system for dealing with ethical concerns of lawyers).
30. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
31. Ross, supra note 2, at 206-16 (discussing the value of internal reporting mechanisms in
helping overcome attorney reluctance to report others' misconduct). In particular, junior attor-
neys who fear retaliation appear to be particularly reluctant to report violations. Id. at 209.
32. Legal experts recognize the role of firm managers in cultivating a moral climate within in a
firm. As stated by Professor Lerman, ""standards of ethical conduct can be raised successfully only
by the leadership of the firm because higher ethical standards may reduce profits, and junior lawyers
are under intense pressure to contribute to the firm's profit margin. Lerman, supra note 9, at 681.
33. See John S. Dzienkowski, Legal Malpractice and the Multistate Law Fir,: Supervision of
Multi state Offices; Firm as Limited Liability Partnerships; and Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate
Client Malpracttce Claims, 36 S. TF.X. L. Riv. 967, 976-78 (1995 (describing the differences
between monitoring mechanisms in large and small firms).
34. Respondents checked all measures and systems used by their firms.
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Associates may consult the firm's ethics system or policy when they
encounter questionable billing practices by other firm attorneys. The majority
of the respondents (52%) noted that they have had concerns about the billing
practices of other firm attorneys." When asked about how they handled the
concerns, the largest percentage (61%) noted that they "discussed the matter
with another associate" while only 24% indicated that they "discussed the mat-
ter with a supervisor or managing attorney." The associates' peers, unlike the
associates' superiors, probably possess limited experience and power to
address the perceived problem. Under these circumstances, consultation with
other associates appears to be more cathartic than corrective.'" Given the
apparent reluctance of many associates to consult their superiors and the large
number of associates (27%) who "did nothing" when they had concerns about
the billing practices of others, firm managers should not rely solely on associ-
ate feedback. Rather, supervising and billing attorneys should diligently moni-
tor billing practices and records.
Survey results suggest that many supervising attorneys may not be ques-
tioning billing entries. Sixty-seven percent of the respondents on the partner-
ship track indicated that during the last year their supervising attorneys never
"questioned" 7 the associates' billing entries." Among Large Firm associates,
the percentage reporting that their billings had not been questioned goes up to
71%." Especially in firms where associates face a great deal of pressure to bill,
this lack of scrutiny may allow billing abuses and questionable billing practices
to go undetected.
BILLING PRACTICES ADDRESSED IN ABA ETHICS OPINION 93-379
ABA Formal Ethics Opinion 93-379 tackled a number of questionable
35. In his 1991 and 1994.95 surveys Professor Ross found "distressing indications " of the
extent to which attorneys perceive that other attorneys abuse hourly billing. Ross, supra note 2,
at 29. His 1994.95 study revealed that approximately "one sixth of both the inside and outside
counsel said that they believe that more than a quarter of all billable time is padded." Id.
36. In private practice as an associate and partner, I observed the associate subculture.
37. One respondent commented that the term "questioned" was ambiguous. This term was
used to encompass all possible scrutiny from an outright challenge of an billing entry to a simple
inquiry,
38. Another 31% of the respondents on the partnership track noted that their supervising
attorneys had "occasion;dly" questioned their billing entries during the last year. Only 2% of the
respondents indicated that their supervising attorneys had "frequently" questioned their billing
entries.
39. In all categories the results reveal a relationship between firm size and supervisors ques-
tioning billing with more scrutiny occurring in the smaller firms. For example, 56% of the Small
Firm respondents and 65% of the Medium Firm respondents reported that their supervisor had
'never" questioned their billings during the last year. The percentage of respondents who noted
that their supervisors had "frequendy" questioned their billings was 6% in the Small Firms, 2%
in the Medium Firms and less than 1% in the Large Firms. Supervisors in smaller firms who work
closely with their associates may be better position to evaluate and question billing entries.
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practices"0 related to the ethics of hourly billing." After explaining that an attor-
ney "who has agreed to bill on the basis of hours expended does not fulfill her
ethical duty if she bills the client for more time than she actually spends on the
client's behalf," the opinion condemns particular billing practices including
"double-billing" and "recycling" work," In this context, Professor Ross defines
"double-billing" as billing two clients for work performed at the same time.4'
"Re-cycled work" refers to billing "clients by the hour for work that was creat-
ed at another time for another client."' In his 1991 and 1994-95 surveys
Professor Ross asked inside and outside counsel about both double billing and
billing for recycled work.
In comparing the results on the 1994-95 survey to the 1991 survey,
Professor Ross noted that attitudes of outside counsel "changed markedly dur-
ing recent years."'" He found that the number of respondents who said that they
had never engaged in double billing increased from one half in 1991 to three
40. ABA Standing Conm, on Ethics and Prof. Responsibility Formal Op. 93-379 (1993) (refer-
ring to "problematic billing practices" that are "the subject of frequent inquiry, with the goal of
helping the profession adhere to its ethical obligations to its clients despite economic pressures.")
[hereinafter ABA Opinion 93-3791. Some commentators characterize certain practices in the
ABA Opinion as "questionable" because of the differences of opinion on the ethics of the prac.
rices. E.g. Adam C. Altman, To Bill, or Not to Bill?: Lawyers Who Wear Watches Almost Always
Do, Although Ethical Lawyers Actually Think About It First, 11 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 204, 214
n.81, at 214 (1998) (referring to those who view double billing as "questionable" unlike "outright
fraud' which is clearly unethical). For arguments justifying double-billing under certain circum-
stances, see ROSS, supra note 2, at 80-83 (introducing the discussion by noting that the ethics of
double.billing "are more complex that the ABA's opinion suggests."). Compare Roy Simon 22
HOFST,\ L. REv. 625, Gross Profits? An Introduction to a Program on Legal Fees, 22 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 625 633 (1994 (referring to a "fairly sarcastic op-ed column from sociologist Amitai Etzioni
asking why lawyers needed to be told these things at all.")
41. The opinion divides the practices into two sets. The first set involves 'billing more than
one client for the same hours spent" and the second relates to billing for expenses and disburse.
ments. ABA Opinion 93-379, supra note 40.
42. According to the opinion a lawyer "who has agreed to bill solely on he basis of time spent
is obliged to pass the benefits of (the) economies on to the client." Id. Therefore, an attomey
who "flies for six hours for one client, while working for five hours on behalf of another, has not
earned eleven billable hours." Id. "A lawyer who is able to reuse old work product has not re-
earned the hours previously billed and compensated when the work product was first generated.
" In short, the lawyer who is billing by the hour is never permitted "to charge the client for more
hours than were actually expended on the client matter." Id.
43. Ross, supra note 2, at 79. For a discussion of the ethical problems with double billing, see
Sonia S. Chan, Note, ABA Formal Opinion 93-379: Double Billing, Padding and Other Forms of
Overhillinp 9 GEO.J. LEGAL En"Hics 611, 617-25 (1996).
44. 1d. While Professor Ross offers justifications for double-billing, he emphatically states that
hourly billing for recycled work is "clearly unethical." Id. at 82, 83. Cf Kevin Hopkins, Lau
Firms, Technology, and the Double Billing Dilenma, 12 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 95, 99 (1998) (stat.
ing that the ethics rules do not provide guidance for determining an appropriate fee when a
lawyer uses recycled work).
45. Id. at 83
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quarters in 1994-95.7 Professor Ross found a similar pattern in the responses to
the questions related to the ethics of billing for recycled work. On the 1991 sur-
vey 12% of respondents believed that it was never "ethical for an attorney to bill
a client for work (e.g. research or drafting) that originally was undertaken for
another client and has been 're-cycled' for a second client."" In the 1994-95
study that percentage increased to 65%." Professor Ross suggests that the
changes in attitudes reflect a "growing awareness of the ethical impropriety of
billing for re-cyclcd work." This trend continues as indicated by the survey
results discussed in the next section.
SURVEY RESULTS RELATED TO DOUBLE BILLING & RECYCLED
WORK
The questionnaire used in the Associate Survey included some questions
similar to those used in the Ross surveys. The double billing question asked,
"During the last year, have you ever billed two clients for work performed at the
same time (e.g. billing one client for reviewing a deposition while billing anoth-
er client for travel time?) In response to this question, 86% of the respondents
answered "no." On the recycled work question, 83 % of the respondents noted
that they do not bill more than the revision time when revising and recycling a
document originally prepared for another client.
Interestingly, the percentage of the respondents who engage in the double
billing and recycled work practices goes down as firm size increases." While
only 10% of the respondents in Large Firms admitted double billing, 14% in
Medium Firms and 24% in Small Firms admitted double billing during the last
year.'" A similar pattern occurred on the responses to the recycled work ques-
tion. A shocking 30% of the associates in Small Firms indicated that during the
last year they recycled work and charged the hourly client more than the revi-
sion time. In Medium Firms and Large Firms the percentage goes down to
46. Id. The comparison also reveals that the number of respondents who believed that double
billing is never ethical increased from one-f'fth in 1991 to two.thirds in 1994.95. Id. Professor
Ross attributes the change to "the widcsprcad discussion of ethics of double billing, which pro-
duced a consensus that (the practice) is unethical," Id.
47, Wrlliam G. Ross, The Ethics of Houry Billing by Attorney, 44 RUTGERS L. REv. 1, 93 app. A.
Another twenty percent of the respondents believed that the practice was ethical "even if the second
client is billed on the basis of time and is not informed that the work was re-cycled." Id. Professor
Ross described this result as perhaps "the most showing reveiation of my 1991 survey." Id.
48. Ross, supra note 2, at 267.
49. These results appear to refute the perception that the pressure on big firm attorneys to bill
leads to questionable billing practices. See ABA Opinion 93.379, supra note 40 (referring to the
"common perception that pressure on lawyers to bill a minimum number of hours and on law firms
to maintain or improve profits may have led lawyers to engage in problematic billing practices").
50. A cross tabulation between the responses to the double.billing question and the billable
hours requirements reve.ded no significant relationship. Similarly; the results indicated no signifi.
cant relationship between the responses on number of hours billed and the double billing questions.
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19% and 9%, respectively. These differences in percentages may relate to the
possibility that some associates in Small and Medium Firms may not have
enough work to fulfill their annual billable requirements. "
Contrary to what might be expected, the results revealed that a larger per-
centage of associates in the lower income categories double bill compared to
associates in the higher income categories. While 20% of those associates who
make $50,000 to S84,999 indicated that they double billed within the last year,
only 9% of the associates who make over $125,000 admitted doing do."
Similarly, the largest percentage of associates who charged for more than revi-
sion time occurred in the income category of between $50,000 and $84,999."
These associates in the lower income category may feel more pressure to pro-
duce than those whose income is higher. More attention to the ethics of double
billing and billing for recycled work might reduce the number of attorneys who
engage in those practices. Fifty-seven percent of the respondents indicated that
their supervising attorneys and firms had not provided any guidance on the two
practices. Slightly over half of the respondents (51 %) noted that they had not
even heard of ABA Opinion 93-379.1 Of those who had read or heard about
the opinion, a smaller percentage of them engaged in double billing, as com-
pared to those respondents who had not heard of the opinion."
Finally, the responses related to double billing and recycled work may be
the ones in the questionnaire that are the most susceptible to self-reporting
errors and impression management.' Respondents who deny questionable
practices may be engaged in "enhancement (the claiming of positive attributes),
51. The responses revealed no significant relationship between the responses to the question
on recycled work and the number of billable hours required.
52. Ten percent of the associates whose income is between $85,000 and $124,999 admitted that
they double-billed during the last year.
53. Among those associates whose income was $50,000 to S84,999,22 % reported that they billed
for more than revision time, while 14% of those who mace between S125,000 and $159,999 did so.
54. When Professor Ross asked the same question in 1994-95, 57% of the respondents indi-
cated that they had not heard about the year old ABA Opinion 93-379. Ross, supra note 2, at
267. In the Associate Survey the number of associates who at least had heard about the opinion
should have been greater if more law school professional responsibility classes and continuing
legal education programs included discussion on the ethics of hourly billing.
55. Among the respondents who admitted double billing, 7% had read ABA Opinion 93-379.
The percentage goes up to 28% for those who had heard about the opinion, but not read it. The
largest percentage of those who double billed were those who had not even heard of the opinion.
This suggests that reading and knowledge of ABA Opinion 93-379 influenced a number of
respondents. On the other hand, a cross tabulation of the respondents who had read the ABA
opinion and those who billed for recycled work revealed no significant relationship.
56. The term "impression management" describes "the behavior of attempting to manipulate
others' impressions through 'the selective exposure of some information (it may be false infor.
mation)... coupled with suppression of [other] information."' RONALD JAY COHEN & MA~tK E.
SWERKLIK, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING AND ASSESSMENT: AN INIFRODUCIION to TEsiS AND
MEASUREMENT 389 (4th ed. 1999).
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denial (the repudiation of negative attributes), or self-deception (the tendency
to give favorably biased but honestly held self-descriptions)." 7 The anonymous
nature of the answers helps counter the desire of some respondents to provide
socially acceptable answers that may not be truthful."
THE QUANTIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW PRACTICE
Commentators and attorneys alike have bemoaned the trend in firms that
emphasizes the quantity of billable hours over the quality of work performed."
Walt Bachman in a chapter called, "The Almighty Billable Hour," captured the
"ascendant importance of billable hours" by describing billable hours as "the lit-
mus test of the worth and financial success of a lawyer or law firm."' In The
Rodent, an underground newsletter for associates, one anonymous writer
explained how his firm used billable hour production as a measuring stick for suc-
cess. Reportedly, firm partners chided the associate for not billing enough hours,
but praised the associate one-month when he racked up a large number of hours"
In those firms that emphasize quantity of hours over quality, associates largely
compete by racking up hours.' As described by Dean Anthony T. Kronman:
The increased emphasis on hours billed as a criterion for measuring
associate performance-which reflects in part the cultural devaluation
of other attributes less directly connected to the external good of mon-
eymaking and in part the administrative need for a uniform quantita-
tive standard of evaluation in firms who size makes more-qualitative
criteria unworkable-has in turn propelled competition of associates
more and more in this direction. Increasingly, associates at large firms
themselves equate success-promotion and prestige-with hours billed.'
57. Id.
58. See Connie J. A. Beck, Lawyer Distress: Alcohol-related Problems and other Psychological
Concerns Among A Sample of Practicing Lawyers, 10 J. L. & HEALTH 1, 12-13 (1995-96) (compar-
ing the relative advantages and disadvantages of self-reporting questionnaires).
59. Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow asserts that using billable hours to make more quantita-
tive than qualitative decisions creates instability in firms by reducing "bonding between senior
attorneys and associates and by creating a 'time famine."' Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Culture Clash
in the Quality of Life in the Law: Changes in the Economics, Diversification and Organization of
Lauw.,ering, 44 CASE. W Rjis. L. REv. 621, 632, (1994).
60. WALT BACHIL ,N, LAW v. LIFE: WHAT LAWYERS ARE AFRAID TO SAY ABOUT THE LEGAl.
PROFFSSION 102 (1995). "A lawyer who allows his or her annual billable hours to slip too low ...
risks more than a decrease in income, Survival, of the lawyer within the firm ... is at stake." Id.
61. Paul Reidinger, Confessions of the Rodent. A.B.A.J., Aug. 1995, at 82, 83.
62. Compare Michael Sean Quinn, Attorneys' Fees and Lawyers' Billings: A Tale of Emperors'
Old Clothes, ENVL. CLAIMS J., Autumn 1997, at 131, 133 (referring to the "time card mentality")
:vith Cornelia Wallis, The Honest Hour: The Ethics of Time Based Billings 6, Attorneys, PROF.
LAV., Aug. 1996, at 14 (stating that a "lawyer's worth, his or her value to a law firm, is measured
today by the numbers of hours billed").
63. ANTHONY T. KRONNMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 302
(1993).
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In a work culture with minimumn hour expectations, associates quickly
learn that falling below the minimum risk job loss and exceeding the minimum
is generously awarded through bonuses,' promotion to partner and an
increased profit share percentage.' One legal auditor asserts that this type of
"incentive compensation" system is "virtually identical to the system con-
demned by consumer protection enforcement officials in the auto repair indus-
try."' Query whether associates who are promoted and compensated largely on
the basis of hours billed and collected are much different that automobile ser-
vice personnel who are compensated for repair sales generated."
One byproduct of quantifying law practice may be an increase in person-
nel claims brought by disgruntled associates.' Some claims may be based on the
firms' refusal to invite an associate into partner ranks. With quantitative evalu-
ations of productivity and value, associates who have "numbers" comparable to
promoted associates may allege discrimination. For example, a female associate
in the Dallas-based firm of Hughes & Luce filed a discrimination complaint
with the Texas Commission on Human Rights after the firm did not promote
her to partner."
The associate claims that she met the firm's objective criteria for partner-
64. Following the recent wave of salary increases some firms acknowledged that they based
bonuses on hours billed. See, e.g. Salary Watch, Tax. LAw., Mar. 20,2000, at 3 (showing how. one
Texas finn's bonuses were based on the number of hours billed). The wave of associate salary
increases started in 1999 resulted in most firms tying raises (and increased bonuses) to higher
hourly billing requirements. Andre Gharakhanian & Yvonne Kriwyj, The Gunderson Effect and
Billable Mania: Trends in Overbilling and the Effect of New Waver, 14 GEo. J. LEGAL ETtICS 1001,
1013 (2000-2001).
65. Elena S. Boisvert, Is the Legal Profession Violating State and Federal Consumer Protection
Laws?, PROF. LA\., Nov. 1997, at 1, 4.
66. Id. at 4 (explaining that regulators concluded that the "incentive compensation" system of
rewarding sales personnel for the number of repairs sold, "created an atmosphere that encour-
aged the sale of unnecessary repairs").
67. See id. at 4 (insisting that law firm compensation systems based on hourly billings are no
better than the "incentive compensation" system attacked by the automobile repair regulators
because law firms "first impose what may be excessive hourly requirements' and then seek to
reward those who can actually exceed the minimum). Id.
68. Associates who feel used or even abused may be more inclined to sue their employers. See
Andrea M. Alonso & Kevin G. Faley, The Law Firm Culture of Abuse, A.B.A. J, Nov. 1998, at 116
(describing verbal abuse and intimidation of associates). Firms that formally seek associate feed.
back can deal with abuse and possibly improve associate morale. For example, the Denver based
firm of Holland & Hart asks associates if they would want to work for particular partners again.
Jonathan Foreman, Poor People Skills Can Collapse Firms, NAr'L L. J., Jan. 29, 1996, at Al. The
information obtained impacts partner compensation. Id. For a discussion of the mechanics of
associate review of partners, see Susan Saab Fortney, Am I My Partner's Keeper? Peer Review in
Lau, Firms, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 329,367 (1995).
69. Angela Ward, A Court.Ordered Partner? Hughes & Luce Associate Seeks Unusual Ruling
TEX. LAW., Aug. 2, 1999, at I (noting that the associate is awaiting a Texas Commission on
Human Rights decision before she files a discrimination suit in state court).
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ship-the clients, the hours and the years.70 By emphasizing and rewarding objec-
tive accomplishments such as hour production, firms make themselves vulnera-
ble to such complaints.
The resdts from the Associate Survey revealed that many firms do reward
hours production, employing an incentive compensation system focusing asso-
ciate evaluations on hours billed and collected. Thirty-two percent of the
respondents noted that they strongly agreed with the statement, "My income
and advancement within the firm are principally based on the number of hours
that I bill and collect." Another 44% indicated that they "somewhat agree" with
the statement. Comments also reflected the emphasis placed on hours billed,
When asked about their firms' annual billing requirement, four respondents
volunteered that their firms' based bonuses on billable hours recorded or col-
lected. In the general comment section one respondent flatly stated, "h[t]e firm
has one goal-maximize billing at any cost." One respondent referred to the
"disturbing trend" of firms to "reduce annual income in favor of a bonus sys-
tem that is almost exclusively tied to billable hours." As stated, "Given that the
more lucrative bonuses kick in at 23 00+, it is easy to see the allure of 'padding'
the time sheet." Another respondent noted that "basing bonuses 100% on bill-
able hours ... encourages people to "pad" their time,"
Interestingly, Professors David B. Wilkins and G. Mitu Gulati described
this exact consequence in discussing the partners' ability to monitor shirking by
associates. They suggest that using hours to measure associates' work creates an
incentive for associates to inflate their hours, "to the extent that associates
believe that partners view hours as a surrogate for quality."" Moreover, "part-
ners will generally find it difficult to detect" when associates pad their hours
because of the difficulty in correlating the quality and quantity of work pro-
duced" Francis H. Musselman, Abandon the Billable Hour! N.Y ST. B.J.,
July/Aug. 1995, at 28, 28-29.
Padding may occur when attorneys overstate the amount of work actually
performed, overwork files, or fail to complete work in the most efficient man-
70. Id. at 16.
71. David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking,
Seeding, and Information Control in the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law Firms, 84 VA. L. REv.
1581, 1594 (1998).
72. Id. at 1595-96 (illustrating the "limited usefulness of using hours as a measure of associate
effort"). The following illustrates how billable hours do not reflect quality or output:
The number of billable hours worked by Lawyer A in any particular time period measures
the amount of time required to do the work he or she did during that period. The number
of billable hours tells us nothing about the quality of, or the quantity of, Lawyer A's work
product. Lawyer B might have accomplished as much in half the time... Lawyer B who
takes half the time might be said to be to be twice as productive as Lawyer A .... If one only
considers the raw number of hours each worked, B would be the least productive....
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ner." In all these situations, inefficiency and even billing fraud may be reward-
ed when attorneys' worth is based on billables. 4 Simply stated, hourly billing
creates an incentive to overwork files and misrepresent time because the more
hours worked, the more fees are generated.' As observed by one survey respon-
dent, "the biggest problem I saw (at two medium sized firms) was attorneys who
billed for time they didn't work."7"
Attorneys may be tempted to overwork files and to bill for work they didn't
actually do when they do not have enough work to meet the firm's billing
requirements. Professor Lerman explains that associates who do not have
enough work to legitinately bill the required number of hours, must choose:
"(1) to do unnecessary work; (2) to lie about the number of hours worked; or
(3) to fail to meet the firm minimum and reduce her chances of become a part-
ner" ;7 or even keeping her job. On the other hand, associates who have enough
work to fulfill the billing requirements7 and associates who have client contact
may be less inclined to overwork files and to engage in other questionable
billing practices.
73. A report of the ABA Law Practice Management Section noted that lawyers "are being
pushed to the edge by myriad pressures" including "incentives that fail to reward efficiency and
effectiveness, " and "increasing t,-mptations to keep hours or income up by overworking files, tak-
ing shortcuts, and performing lower level routine work." BEYOND THE BRFAKING POINT TASK
FORCE, ABA LAw PRACTICE v NAGEMENT SECTION, BEYOND THE BRFAKING POINT: A REPORT
AND PLAN FOR AcTION 2 (Dec. 28, 1992). One author theorizes that attorneys who increase the
number of hours spent on matters "tend, on average, to overstate legal risks" in an effort to justi-
fy time spent on a matter." Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skeuing The Resultv:
The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting LegalRules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDIsc. L .J. 375, 391 (1997).
74. Ironically, hourly billing which was originally "hailed for its objectivity and efficiency...
increasingly has been assailed for encouraging inefficiency, excessive litigation, and fraud." Ross,
supra note 47, at 2. Because of the incentives created, one commentator characterized hourly
billing as a "devilish creature that rewards inefficiency and penalizes productivity." Elizabeth A.
Kovachevich & Geri L. Waksler, The Legal Professton: Edging Closer to Death With Each Parring
Hour, 20 STETSON L. REv. 419, 426 (citing a NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL commentator). Compare
David J. Waxse, Ethical Implications of Hourly Billing, J. KAN. B.A., Dec., 1998, at 2 (noting that
hourly billing "creates disincentives for competent and prompt resolution in representations
[because) the lawyer is paid for time, not value..."
75. Stephen W. Jones & Melissa Brenda Glover, The Attack on Traditional Billing Practices, 20
ARK. LIr'.E ROCK L.. 293, 295 (1998).
76. The respondent stated that the "other big problem is attorneys that do not create timely
time sheets. Attorneys that try to recreate a months worth of billing at the end of the month always
end up billing more time than they actually worked."
77. Lerman, supra note 9, at 674, One associate quoted by Professor Lerman described the "no
win" situation as follows, "The problem is that they want these many hours, and you're looking
for work to do, and there is not work to do. You have to fudge." Id. at 714.
78. One respondent recognized that questionable billing practices may he less likely to occur
when attorneys have an adequate amount of work to handle. As stated, "Billable hours have never
been an issue as there is more legitimate work than we can handle. If we can keep our clients
happy-billable hours take care of themselves. I have only seen one or two instances of 'question-
able' billing practices."
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BILLING PRESSURE AND THE EXODUS OF ETHICAL ASSOCIATES
Another unintended consequence of quantifying law practice is that ethi-
cal attorneys who do not pad or work long hours may be placed at competitive
disadvantage come evaluation time. A couple of respondents referred to this
problem. One respondent who described his/her diligence in using an elec-
tronic timer program to bill by the minute, expressed frustration over colleagues
who estimate their time. The respondent stated, "I can't compete xtith estima-
tors, but I'm not willing to compromise my strict billing practice either." In not-
ing that the billable hours system "encourages lying" another respondent
explained, "If you don't lie, you are perceived to be a slacker, even though, in
reality, you may work far more than others." "Slacker" associates may feel pres-
sure to change their practices or find other employment. Ethical associates who
refuse to compromise their standards may become increasingly disillusioned in
having to compete with other associates who use questionable billing practices
to record hours. These ethical associates may voluntarily leave private practice.
Results from the Associate Survey reveal that a large number of respon-
dents see the connection between pressure and ethical attorneys abandoning
private law practice. The questionnaire asked the respondents to indicate their
agreement or disagreement with the following statement, "Billing pressure caus-
es ethical and competent attorneys to leave private law practice." The largest
percentage of the respondents (31%) neither agreed nor disagreed with the
statement. Forty-six percent noted some level of agreement with the statement."
Personally, I believe that this is the most disturbing survey result because it sug-
gests that billing pressure may be causing firms to lose ethical associates and
future leaders who uphold high ethical standards.
ETHICS COUNSELS ROLE IN ADDRESSING THE BILLING ABUSES
AND THE DELETERIOUS EFFECTS OF INCREASED BILLABLE
HOUR PRESSURE
While the position of ethics advisor varies from firm to firm, firm managers
and ethics advisors should agree on the approach used. At one end of the con-
tinuum are "reactive" ethics advisors who deal with specific problems present.
ed to them. For example, the title "conflicts resolution counsel" used by an
ethics advisor implies that the advisor's role is largely limited to determining if
and how a firm can handle prospective representation. At the other end of the
continuum are proactive ethics advisors whose work goes beyond dealing with
individual problems. Rather, proactive ethics advisors strive to improve firm
policies, procedures and systems relating to ethical practice. The proactive
79. Sixteen pcrccnt noted that they strongly agreed with the statement and 30% indicated that
they somewhat agree -ith the statement that billing pressure causes ethical and competent attor-
neys to leave private law practice. Thirteen percent checked that they "somewhat disagree" with
the statement and another 10% noted that they "strongly disagree."
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approach is particularly valuable in addressing firm-wide issues such as billing
practices and the effects of billable hour pressure.
As a starting point, ethics advisors should study their firms' existing billing
procedures, practices and policies. hi this process, the advisor can obtain assis-
tance of the firm's malpractice insurer or use self-audit questionnaires developed
by risk management experts. For example, Anthony Davis has developed a
Billing Systems and Control Questionnaire that includes 36 questions and com-
mentary for analyzing the answers.' Some of the questions involve straight audit-
ing functions such as confirming that the billing rate charged is the same as the
rate set forth in the engagement letter."' Other questions require a more qualita-
tive evaluation to determine if clients are inproperly being charged for a "learn-
ing curve" or unnecessary overstaffing." The answers to the questions will pro-
vide firm management with an assessment of the firnms current time-charge and
billing processes, revealing what gaps or issues need to be addressed.s"
In the process of evaluating billing policies and procedures, billing guide-
lines should be carefully evaluated. If the firm does not have written billing
guidance, an ethics advisor should spearhead the adoption of clear billing
guidelines. By encouraging firm managers and section leaders to adopt and
enf6rce billing guidelines, ethics advisers counter the ostrich approach taken by
firm managers who require attorneys bill a high number of hours without giv-
ing attorneys meaningful guidance on how to bill ethically While firm partners
may financially benefit from questionable billing practices by taking the posi-
tion that "if I don't see it, it's not happening," results from the Associate Survey
suggest that the failure to implement and enforce clear billing guidelines hurts
ethical associates who refuse to engage in questionable practices. Close to three
quarters of the survey respondents indicated that they agreed or somewhat
agreed with the statement, "Clear billing guidelines would help attorneys who
want to practice ethically." Ethics advisors can assist section leaders in articu-
lating guidelines suitable for particular practice areas. Such guidelines should
be coupled with training of attorneys and support staff.
Periodically, an ethics advisor can assist the firm in monitoring compliance
with the guidelines. Some firms have started auditing attorneys' billing and
expense records. For example, Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn in New
York created the position of an internal auditor, an accountant who "makes
sure the rules of the game are being observed by everyone."' The firm's chief
operating officer reports that having an auditor "provides an extra incentive for
80. ANTHONY E. DAvis, RISK MLANAGEMENT SURVIVAL TOOLS FOR LAW FrR14s 107-110 (1995)
81. Id. at 108, question 23(a).
82. Id. at 107, questions 23 (e) and (f).
83. See id. at 167 (describing the function of the self audit).
84. Edward A. Adams, Could Managing Partner Steal Firm Funds Here; N.Y.LJ., May 20,
1994, at I (citing Robert Kafin, the firm's chief operating partner).
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people to be careful" as well as the "opportunity to find mispostings or
errors."' Periodic random checks by ethics advisors promise to have the same
prophylactic effect. Another approach would be for ethics advisors to initiate
audits of billing records of attorneys who bill over a certain level such as 2200
hours a year.s
For routine auditing of bills, a firm might purchase software marketed by
legal bill auditors. Some companies, including PeerPoint Technologies, sell soft-
ware designed for law firms, allowing firms to pre-clear bills before sending
them to clients. 7
In an effort to learn what is happening in the billing trenches, firm man-
agers and supervisors should encourage all firm attorneys and other personnel
to contact the firm's ethics counsel with questions and concerns related to ethics
and billing. If ethics advisors are visible, associates and support staff members
will be more inclined to consult the advisor rather than doing nothing or mere-
ly discussing the matter with peers. Firm attorneys and staff members will also
be less reluctant to report billing problems if the ethics counsel or committee
ensures that employees who report misconduct are protected from retaliation.8
On a more institutional level, ethics counsel should assist firm mangers in
reexamining structures in firms that have contributed, if not caused, various
problems related to emphasizing billable hours and business generation. Acting
with some objective distance, the ethics counsel can instigate consideration of
the firm's compensation system for associates, as well as partners. The review of
a compensation system should focus on identifying the conduct that the system
rewards."' Specifically, the firm's compensation system should encourage ethical
practice and motivate associates and partners alike to behave in ways that are
beneficial to the firm and its clients.
Ethics advisors can urge firm managers to rethink the advisability of high
billable hour requirements and a compensation system that awards bonuses
based on numerical billing benchmarks.' In lieu of rewarding "heavy handed"
billers, firm managers and ethics advisors should scrutinize the work of attor-
neys who regularly bill an extraordinary number of hours. When possible firms
85. Erin White, T1IE WALL STREET JOURNAL, July 14, 1998, at B8.
86. Professor Lisa G. Lerman recommends systematic audits of billing practices of attorneys
who bill over 2,000 hours per year or more. Lerman, supra note 3, at 298.
87. Wayne J. Lovettt, Services and Software Help Manage Legal Billings: An Entire Industry is
Devoted to Making Sense of Mind.numbing Bills and Spouting Irregularities, NAT'L L. J., Dec. 14,
1998, at B8 (reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of various software products).
88. Lerman, mpra note 3, at 298.
89. The Keeping the Keepers Report, supra note 15, at 47.
90. Firm managers should ask whether the billable hour requirement for associates is a fair one
to them and to firin clients. (emphasis added) James S. Bolan, Ethics, Risk and Malpractice
Avoidance, MNASS. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATllON 2000, ETHLI MA-CLE 23-i.
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should recognize and reward ethical conduct. Firms could expressly include
ethical conduct as a criterion in evaluating and compensating attorneys."j Such
moves would send a message to firm attorneys and clients that the firm values
quality over quantity"
Ethics advisors should also attempt to evaluate how compensation sys-
tems are undermining attorneys' willingness to devote time to mentoring, super-
vision and training. Partner compensation systems that do no reward supervi-
sion time on an equal basis xdth other time punish supervisors in different ways.
First, supervisory attorneys do not receive the short-term monetary rewards
from billing and generating business. Second, supervision time may actually
hurt supervisors' mobility if time devoted to supervision competes with the time
that supervisors spend building their own portable client base.' A compensa-
tion system should not punish supervisors and mentors, but should adequately
compensate them for their contributions to their firms.'
By taking steps recommended above, proactive ethics advisors can pre-
vent some problems and discover other problems, enabling firm managers to
address improprieties before a subpoena server arrives. Long term, such efforts
reap benefits in attracting and retaining ethical attorneys, as well as clients
impressed by law firm accountability and professionalism.
91. See Sarat, supra note 26, at 827 (quoting an associate who said that partners treat ethics "as
a matter of sanctioning people for bad behavior rather than rewarding good behavior").
92. For recommendations on how firms can emphasize quality, over quantity, see Ronald M.
Martin, The Empowered Law Firm-Driving Empowerment: Reengineering our Context, 20 No. 7
Law PR\c. MGtmi*. 34 (1994).
93. "Top lawyers may also be unwilling to devote considerable time to management, recogniz-
ing that they stand to benefit more from portable assets like client relationships and substantive
legal skills than from firm-based assets like cfficient management structures and sound financial
practices." Deborah K. Holmes, Learning from Corporate America: Addressing Dysfunction in the
Large Law Firm, 31 GONrZ. L. REv. 373, at 404 (1995-96)
94. If firm partners are concerned that partners might fudge on supervision time recorded, the
firm could set annual maximums for supervision time that will be calculated into the objective
portion of the compensation system. The annual maximum could vary depending on the posi-
tion that the supervisor holds. For example, a member of a firm's ethics committee may have a
higher annual maximum than a member of the firm's recruitment committee. Another way of
monitoring supervision time is to implement some form of peer review in which information is
sought from associates and partners. For a review of the models of peer review, see Fortney, supra
note 68, at 363-70.
